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1.  INTRODUCTION
The "simultaneous ascending auction" was first introduced in 1994 to sell licenses to use
bands of radio spectrum in the United States. Much of the attention devoted to the auction came
from its role in reducing federal regulation of the radio spectrum and allowing market values,
rather than administrative fiat, to determine who would use the spectrum resource. Many
observers were also fascinated by the extensive reliance of the auction on web-like information
technology.  The large amounts of money involved were yet another source of interest.  The very
first use of the auction rules was a US$617 million sale of ten paging licenses in July 1994. In
the broadband PCS auction, which began in December 1994, ninety-nine licenses were sold for a
total price of approximately US$7 billion.  Once the auctions had been conducted, it became
much harder to ignore the tremendous value of the large amounts of spectrum allocated to uses
such as high definition television, for which Congress had demanded no compensation at all.
Moreover, the perceived successes with the new rules inspired imitators to conduct similar
spectrum auctions in various countries around the world.
Among academic economists, another reason to be interested in the auction is that the
design made detailed use of the ideas of economic theory and the recommendations of economic
theorists.  ][ndeed,  the US communications regulator adopted its important rules from two
detailed prDposals  for a simultaneous ascending auction: one by Preston McAfee and the other by
Robert Wi lson and me. Economic analysis dictated nearly all of the rule choices in the first few
auctions.  'Various reviews suggest that the new auction design realized at least some of the
theoretical advantages that had been claimed for it.2
Sevreral  parts of economic theory proved helpful in designing the rules for simultaneous
ascending auction and in thinking about how the design might be improved and adapted for new
applications.  After briefly reviewing the major rules of the auction in section 2, we turn in
section 3 to an analysis based on tatonnement theory, which regards the auction as a mechanism
for discovering an efficient allocation and its supporting prices.  The analysis reveals a
fundamental difference between situations in which the licenses are mutual substitutes and others
in which the same  licenses  are sometimes  substitutes  and sometimes  complements. When  the
'My  thanks pO  to Peter Cramton, Paul Klemperer and Padmanabhan Srinagesh, as well as seminar participants at
the Stanford, the University of Pittsburgh and Yale for comments on an earlier draft.  The World Bank provided
partial financial support.
2 See Cramton (1995), McAfee and McMillan (1996) and Milgrom (1995) for accounts of the auction and the run-
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licenses are mutual substitutes for all bidders, not only is it true that equilibrium prices exist, but
straightforward, "myopic" bidding in the auction leads bidders to prices and an allocation that are
close to competitive equilibrium. This happens even though, unlike traditional tatonnement
processes, prices in the auction process can never fall and can rise only by fixed increments.
However, if even one bidder has demand in which licenses are not all mutual substitutes, then
there is a profile of demands for the other bidders, all of which specify that licenses are mutual
substitutes, such that no competitive equilibrium prices exist.  There is an inherent limitation in
the very conception of the auction as a process for discovering a competitive allocation and
competitive prices in that case.
Section 4 is a selective account of some applications of game theory to evaluating the
simultaneous ascending auction design for spectrum sales.  Game theoretic arguments were
among those that convinced regulators to adopt my suggestion of an "activity rule," which helps
ensure that auctions end in a reasonable amount of time.  Game theory also provided the decisive
argument against the first "combinatorial bidding" proposals.  The closing rule for the US
spectrum auctions have recently been re-evaluated, with proposed changes being subjected to
game theoretic analysis to determine whether they can reduce the susceptibility of the auction to
self-enforcing "collusive" agreements.
Results like those reported in section 3 have led to renewed interest in auctions in which
bids for license packages are permitted.  In section 5, I use game theory to analyze the biases in a
leading proposal for dynamic combinatorial bidding.  Section 6 briefly answers two additional
questions that economists often ask about auction design: If trading of licenses after the auction
is allowed, why does the auction form matter at all for promoting efficient license assignments?
Holding fixed the quantity of licenses to be sold, how sharp is the conflict between the objectives
of assigning licenses efficiently and obtaining maximum revenue? Section 7 concludes.
2.  SIMULTANEOUS  ASCENDING  AUCTION RULES IN BRIEF
A simultaneous ascending auction is an auction for multiple items in which bidding
occurs in rounds. At each round, bidders simultaneously make sealed bids for any items in
which they are interested. After the bidding, round results are posted.  For each item, these
results consist of the identities of the new bids and bidders as well as the "standing high bid" and
the corresponding bidder.  The initial standing high bid for each item is zero and the
"corresponding bidder" is the auctioneer. As the auction progresses, the new standing high bid
at the end of a round for an item is the larger of the previous standing high bid or the highest new
bid and the corresponding bidder is the one who made that bid.  In addition to the round results,
the minimum bids for the next round are also posted.  These are computed from the "standingPUTTINGAUCTiONTHEORY  TO WORK: THE SIMULTANEOUSASCENDINGAUCTION  3
high bid" by adding a pre-determined bid increment.  For spectrum licenses, the increments are
typically the larger of some fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the standing high bid?
A bid represents a real commitment of resources by the bidder.  In the most common
version of the rules, a bidder is pernitted to withdraw bids, but there is a penalty for doing so: if
the sellingJ  price of the item is less than the withdrawn bid, the withdrawing bidder must pay the
difference.  In other applications, bid withdrawals are simply not permitted.
Bidder activity during the auction is controlled by the "activity rule."  It works as follows.
First, a quantity measure for spectrum is established, which provides a rough index of the value
of the license.  Typically, the quantity measure for a spectrum license is based on the bandwidth
of the licensed spectrum and the population of the geographic area covered by the license.  At the
outset of the auction, each bidder establishes its initial eligibility for bidding by making deposits
covering a certain quantity of spectrum. During the auction, a bidder is considered active for a
license at a round if it makes an eligible new bid for the license or if it owns the standing high
bid from the previous round.  At each round, a bidder's  activity is constrained not to exceed its
eligibility.  If a bid is submitted that exceeds the bidder's  eligibility, the bid is simply rejected.
The auction is conducted in three stages. In the first stage, a bidder who wishes to
maintain nits  eligibility must be active on licenses covering some fractionfj  of its eligibility.  If a
bidder with eligibility x is active on a license quantity y<fjx  during this stage, then its eligibility
is reduced at the next round to ylfi.  In the second and third stages, a similar rule applies but
using fractionsf2 andf3.  In recent auctions in the US, the fractions used have been (f1,f2,
f3)=(.6,.8.,.95). Thus, in stage 3, bidders know that the auction is nearing its close in the sense
that the remaining demand for licenses is just 11f3  times the current activity level. 4
The rules also provide for five "waivers" of the activity rule for each bidder.  These were
included to prevent errors in the bid submission process from causing unintended reductions in a
bidder's  eligibility, but they also have some strategic uses.
3 In the spectrum auctions, the percentage has usually been 5% or 10%. The appropriate size of the increment has
also been subjected to economic analysis that takes into account the cost of adding rounds to the auction and the
extent and type of the uncertainty about bidder values.
4 The activiity  rule, the closing rule (described below), and the electronic implementation distinguish this auction
from the "silent auction" commonly used in charity sales.  In a silent auction, the items being sold are typically set
on tables in a room and bidders walk around the room, entering their bids and bidder identification on a paper sheet
in front of the items.  Bidding closes at a pre-determined time.  It is common experience that bidders in silent
auctions often delay placing their bids until the final moment, completing their entry on the paper just as the bidding
closes.PUTTINGAUCTiON  THEORY TO WORK: THE SImULTANEOUSAsCENDINGAUCTION  4
There are several different options for rules to close the bidding that were filed with the
regulator.  One proposal, made by Preston McAfee, specified that when a license had received no
new bids for a fixed number of rounds, bidding on that license would close. That proposal was
coupled with a suggestion that the bid increments for licenses should reflect the bidding activity
on a license.  A second proposal, made by Robert Wilson and me, specified that bidding on all
licenses should close simultaneously when there is no new bidding on any license.  To date, the
latter rule is the only one that has been used in the spectrum auctions, but the closing rule is
presently being scrutinized for possible improvements.
When the auction closes, the licenses are sold at prices equal to the standing high bids to
the corresponding bidders.  The rules that govern deposits, payment terms, and so on are quite
important to the success of the auction, 5 but they are mostly separable from the other auction rule
issues and receive no further comment here.
3.  AUCTIONS  AND  TATONNEMENT  THEORY
The simultaneous ascending auction is a process that, on its surface, bears a strong
resemblance to the tatonnement process of classical economics.  Like the tatonnement process,
the objective of the auction is to identify allocations (which the spectrum regulators call
"assignments") and supporting prices to approximate economic efficiency.  Yet there are striking
differences as well.  First, bids in the auction represent real commitments of resources, and not
tentatively proposed trades.  Consequently, bidders are reluctant to commit themselves to
purchases that may become unattractive when the prices of related licenses change.  Second, in
the auction, prices can never decrease.  That is an important limitation, because the ability of
prices to adjust both upwards and downwards is a fundamental requirement in theoretical
analyses of the tatonnement.  Third, in the simultaneous ascending auction, the bidders
themselves name the prices.  That contrasts with the Walrasian tatonnement, in which some
fictitious auctioneer names the prices.  Other differences arise from the nature of the application.
The licenses sold in the auction are indivisible. This fact means that the set of allocations cannot
be convex, so the usual theorems about existence of competitive equilibrium do not apply.  Our
analysis focuses on all these issues: the risk that bidders take when they commit resources in
early rounds of the auction, the existence of competitive equilibrium, and whether the
simultaneous auction process in which prices increase monotonically can converge to the
equilibrium.
Let L={l,...  ,L} be the set of indivisible licenses to be offered for sale.  Denote a typical
subset of L by S. In describing license demand, we also use S to represent the vector IS.
5 Failure to establish these rules properly led to billions of dollars of bidder defaults in the United States "C-block
auction."  Similar problems on a smaller scale occurred in some Australian spectrum auctions.PUTTINGAUCTION THEORY TO WORK: THESIMULTANEOUSASCENDINGAUCTION  5
We assume that a typical bidder i who acquires the set of licenses S and pays an amount
of money in for the privilege enjoys utility of vi(S)-m.  Given a vector of pricespe9lL+,  p  S
denotes the total price of the licenses composing S. The demand correspondence for i is defined
by Di  (p) =-  Arg max  {v 1(S) - p. S} . We assume  that  there is  free disposal,  so ScS' implies that
vi(S)< Vi(S ).  S
We sometimes omit the subscript from demand functions, relying on the context to make
the meaning clear.  An individual bidder has excess demand for the set of licenses T (or, more
simply "demands" the licenses) at price vectorp, written yeX(p), if there exists SeD(p)  such that
SDT.
The usual definition of substitutes needs to be generalized slightly to deal with the case of
demand correspondences.  The idea is still the same though: raising the prices of licenses outside
the set S cannot reduce the demand for licenses in the set.
Delfinition.  Licenses  are mutual  substitutes  if for every  pair of price vectors  p'>p, SE
X(p)  implies that SeX(psp  5).
After any round of bidding, the minimum bids for the next round are given by the rule
described in section 2. If the standing high bids at a round are given by the vector p  E 9  then
the minimum bid at the next round for the 1` license is p, +emax(p,  , A) for some 8>0. The
vector of minimum bids is then p + s(p v p),  where p  X91L+ is a parameter of the auction
design, andL  the ''join" p v p denotes the price vector that is the component-wise maximum ofp
and p.
During a simultaneous ascending auction, the minimum bid increment drives a wedge
between the prices faced by different individual bidders.  To analyze the progress of the auction,
it is useful to define the personalized price vectorpi  facing bidderj  at the end of a round to be
Pi=  (Ps ,(p+  .6(pv  ))_s).  That is,j's  prices for licenses it has been assigned arej's  own
standing high bids, but its prices for the other licenses are the standing high bids plus the
minimum bid increment.  This reflects the fact that under the rules of the auction,j can no longer
purchase those other licenses at their current standing high bids.
Our analysis of the tatonnement process consists of a study of what happens to bidderj
when it (possibly) alone bids in a "straightforward" manner, and what happens when all bidders
bid in a straightforward manner.  When we say thatj  bids "straightforwardly," we mean that if,
at the end of some round n, bidderj  has excess demand for the licenses assigned to it (formally,
if SyEXj(i)),  thenj makes the minimum bid at round n+l  on a set of licenses T such that Sj  Tc
Dj(pl).  Intuitively, whenever the auction allows, the straightforward bidder bids to acquire the
set of licenses that it demands at its personalized prices. Notice that the antecedent condition isPUTTINGAUCTiON  THEORY TO WORK: THE SIMULTANEOUSASCENDiNGAUCTiON  6
automatically satisfied at the beginning of the auction, because no bidder has yet been assigned
any licenses.
Straightforward bidding often leads to ties at some rounds of the auctions.  For the
analysis of this section, any tie-breaking rule that selects a winner from among the high bidders
will work.
Our first theorem says that ifj  bids straightforwardly from the beginning of the auction
and if licenses are mutual substitutes for], then the antecedent condition for straightforward
bidding continues to be satisfied round after round.
Theorem 1:  Assume that all the licenses are mutual substitutes for bidder j.  Suppose
that, at the end of round n, bidderj 's assignment S1eXj(pi).  If, at round n+1, bidderj bids
straightforwardly, then, regardless of the bids made by others, j 's assignment Sj 'at the end of
round n+1 satisfies Sj' eXj(pl),  where pl'is  j's personalized price at the end of round n+l.
Proof.  From the auction rules and the definition of the personalized prices, we may draw
two important conclusions. First, Sj'cSjuT.  Second,j's  personalized pricespi'for  the licenses in
Si ' coincide with those of pi, while the personalized prices for licenses in L\Sj' are weakly higher
inpi'  than the corresponding prices inpi.
By hypothesis, SJuTeDj(pl),  so by the first condition and the definition of excess
demand, 5j 'EX 1(pl).  Hence, by the second condition and the definition of mutual substitutes, Si
eXj(pi).  QED
The next issue is what happens when all bidders bid in a straightforward way.  Theorem 2
provides an answer.
Theorem 2:  Suppose all bidders bid straightforwardly.  Then the auction ends with no
new bids after a finite number of rounds. Let (p*,S*) be the  final standing high bids and license
assignment. Then (p  *, S*) is a competitive equilibrium  for the economy with mody4ied  valuation
functions  defined by v; (2) = vj (T) - e(p *  vp)  (T \ Sj*) for  each bidder j.  The  final  assignment
maximizes total value to within a single bid increment:
max  .jvj(Sj)  -Ijvj(Sj*)  <  (p*vp)  L.
Proof:  In view of theorem 1, if the standing high bids for licenses that bidderj  is not
assigned after some round are infinite, bidderj  exactly demands its assignment at the standing
prices.  Hence,  j  must earn a non-negative payoff from its assignment, and similarly for all
bidders when they all bid straightforwardly. That implies that the total price of the licenses
assigned to the bidders after any round of the auction is bounded above by the maximum totalPUTT7NGAUCTIONTHEORYTO  WORK: THESIMULTANEOUSASCENDINGAUCTiON  7
value of the licenses.  Given the positive lower bounds on the bid increments, it follows that the
auction ends after a finite number of rounds.
By construction, bidderj's  excess demand at final price vectorp*  withj's  modified
valuation is the same as its excess demand at the corresponding personalized price vector pi for
the original valuation.  Since there are no new bids byj  at the final round, we may conclude from
the condition of straightforward bidding and Theorem 1 that S. * e D(p*) . Since this holds for
allj,  (p*,S*) is a competitive equilibrium with the modified valuations.
For the second statement of the Theorem, we calculate as follows:
maxE.vj(Sj)  = max[Ej[j(Sj)  +  (p *vp)  (Sj \Sj*)]
< maxEj [ij(Sj)  + 6(p  vp)  Sj]
= maxEj  vj(Sj)+e(p*vp).L
= EjVj  (Sj*)+  s(p *vp)  L
= 2:jvj(Sj*)+e(p*vP)-L
The first equality follows from the definition of the modified valuations; the inequality
from the restriction that all prices are non-negative; and the following equality from the fact that
S partitions L.  The fourth step follows from the already proven fact that (p*,S*) is a competitive
equilibrium for the modified valuations combined with the First Welfare Theorem and the fact
that, with quasi-linear payoffs, a license assignment is efficient if and only if it maximizes the
total value to all the bidders.  Finally, the last equality follows by the definition of  ;()  ), which
coincides with vj (-) when evaluated at Sj*.  QED
If the coefficient £ varies during the auction, then the most relevant values of E for this
analysis are ones that apply when bidders are last eligible to make new bids, which is normally
near the end of the auction. (The activity rule is what makes this statement inexact.)  This
suggests that very high levels of tatonnement efficiency might be obtained by using small
increments near the end of the auction.  It was with this in mind that the Milgrom-Wilson rules
originally adopted in the US by the Federal Communications Commission called for using
smaller minimum bid increments in the final stage of the auction. 6
6 That rule was later changed for transaction costs reasons: smaller increments late in the auction led to large
numbers of costly rounds with relatively little bidding activity.PUTTINGAUCTiON THEORY TO WORK: THESIMULTANEOUSASCENDINGAUCTION  8
Our final questions in this section are:  What relation does the auction outcome have to
the competitive equilibrium outcome?  Does a competitive equilibrium even exist in this setting
with indivisible licenses?  Theorem 3 provides answers.
Theorem 3.  Suppose the licenses are mutual substitutes in demandfor  every bidder.
Then a competitive equilibrium exists. For - sufficiently small, the  final  license assignment S*(e)
is a competitive equilibrium assignment. 7
Proof. Let en-*O and let S*(cn) and p *(en) be corresponding sequences of final license
assignments and prices.  Since there are only finitely many possible license assignments, some
assignment S** must occur infinitely often along the sequence.  Also, each license price is
bounded above by the maximum value of a license package.  So, there exists a subsequence n(k)
along which S*(cn(k))=S** and such that p*(n(k)) converges to somep**.  By Theorem 2, for all
k, Sj *  **eDj(p*(n(k)),  en(,)  where the second argument of Dj identifies the relevant perturbed
preferences.  By the standard closed graph property of the demand correspondence, Si'*e
Dj(p  **),  so (S* *,p  * *) is a competitive equilibrium. QED
Thus, when all licenses are mutual substitutes for all bidders, the simultaneous ascending
auction with straightforward bidding performs quite well. First, a bidder who bids
straightforwardly during the auction is "safe": it is sure to acquire a set of licenses that is nearly
optimal relative to its valuation and the final license prices. If every bidder bids
straightforwardly, then the auction eventually ends with an assignment that approximately
maximizes the total value.  If the bid increment is small, then the final assignment exactly
maximizes the total value and is a competitive equilibrium assignment. The final bids
"approximately support" the solution, in the sense that they are close to the personalized prices
that support the solution for each bidder.  A number proportional to the bid increment bounds the
error in each of these approximations.
What we show next is that these results cannot be much extended.  When the licenses are
not guaranteed to be mutual substitutes, the conclusions are strikingly different.
7 Milgrom and Roberts (1991) show the existence of competitive equilibrium with mutual substitutes using a lattice-
theoretic argument that does not require that all goods are divisible. They proceed to show that a wide variety of
discrete and continuous, "adaptive" and "sophisticated" price adjustment processes converge to the competitive
equilibrium price vector. Unlike the present analysis, however, their analysis assumes that demand is given by a
function, rather than by a correspondence, and they do not address the monotonicity of the auction process.
Gul and Stacchetti (1995) introduce a new concept they call "no complementarities" in the utility function, which is
an alternative formulation of the idea of mutual substitutes. They also introduce a new auction process in which an
auctioneer announces price vectors p and the bidders report their corresponding sets of demands Dj$p). The
auctioneer uses the reported information to control a continuous process of price increases.  For the case in which
there are no complementarities in bidder utility, they demonstrate that their new auction process converges
monotonically up to a competitive equilibrium.PUTNGAUCTION  THEORY  To WORK:  THESImULTANEOUSASCENDINGAUCTioN  9
Theorem 4:  Suppose that the set ofpossible  individual valuation functions  includes all
the ones for which licenses are mutual substitutes in individual demand. Suppose that, in
addition, the set includes at least one other non-zero valuation function.  Then if there are at
least two bifdders,  there is a profile ofpossible individual valuation functions such that no
competitive equilibrium exists.
Intuition for Theorem 4 is given in a two-license, two-bidder example, summarized in the
table below.  In the table, the licenses are denoted by A and B and the bidders by 1 and 2.  Bidder
1 is the bidder for whom licenses are not substitutes. This requires that the value of the pair AB
exceed the sum of the individual values, that is, c>O. Now we introduce another bidder for
whom the same two licenses are substitutes. Let us take c12<d<c. In this case, the unique value-
maximizing  license  allocation  is for  bidder  1 to  acquire  both  licenses.  In  order  to  arrange  for
bidder  2 not  to demand  licenses,  the  prices  must  bepAŽa+d  andpBg2b+d,  but  at these  prices
bidder  1 is unwilling  to buy  the  licenses.  Consequently,  there  exist  no  equilibrium  prices.
A  B  AB
1  a  b  a+b+c
2  a+d  b+d  a+b+d
Proof  of Theorem  4.  Suppose  th4t  there  is a bidder  in the  auction  with  valuation
function  v ifor whom  licenses  are  not  mutual  substitutes.  Then  there  is some  price  vectorp,  real
number  e>O,  and  licensesj  and  k,  such  that  {Y,k}eX(p), butjOX(p\(pj+s))  and  koX(p\(pj+s)).  For
this  bidder,  define  an  indirect  valuation  function  w on  the  set  of  licenses  {,k}  by
w(S)  =  max  v(TU  S)-p  T
TcL\U,k)
The  bidder's  demand  for  licenses  in  the  set  {j,k}  given  the  established  prices  pL\j,  k) for
the  licenses  besidesj  and  k  are  determined  by  w. Set  a=w(j),  b=w(k)  and  c=w(jk)-a-b.  From  our
assumptions  about  the  bidder's  demand,  it  follows  that  c>O and  that pj+pk<a+b+c<p]+pk+  . Let
us  now  introduce  two  new  bidders  (the  argument  also  works,  but  less  transparently,  with  one  new
bidder)  whose  values  are  given  by  following  valuation  function:
v(S)  = p(S \ {J,  k}) + (a + d)les  + (b + d)lka  - dlJrS,keS
where  c/2<d<c.  For  the  new  bidders,  the  various  licenses  are  mutual  substitutes.  (Indeed,
the  bidders'  demands  for  each  license  in L\{,k}  is independent  of  all prices  except  the  license's
own  price.  For  the  two  licensesj  and  k, the  verification  is routine.)  By  construction,  the
competitive  equilibrium  prices,  if they  exist,  of  licenses  in L\ {j,k}  are  given  by p-jk.  But  then  thePUTTING A  UCTION THEORY TO WORK: THE SIMULTANEOUS  ASCENDINGA UCTION  1 0
problem of finding market-clearing prices forj  and k is reduced to the example analyzed above,
in which non-existence of equilibrium prices has already been established.  QED
This non-existence is related as well to a problem sometimes called the "exposure
problem" that is faced by participants in a simultaneous ascending auction.  This refers to the
phenomenon that a bidder who bids straightforwardly according to its demand schedule is
exposed to the possibility that it may wind up winning a collection of licenses that it does not
want at the prices it has bid, because the complementary licenses have become too expensive.  If
the bidders in the tabulated example were to adopt only undominated strategies in the
simultaneous ascending auction game, then it is not possible that the auction will end with bidder
1 acquiring both licenses unless the prices are at least a+d and b+d minus one increment.  The
reason is that bidder 2 always does at least as well (and could do better) in that subgame of the
auction by placing one more bid.  Whenever bidder 1 wins both licenses, it loses money, and at
equilibrium it will anticipate that.  Consequently, at any equilibrium in undominated strategies,
bidder 1 bids no more than a for license A and no more than b for license B.  The result is that
the equilibrium outcome is inefficient and that the "synergy" component of the losing bidder's
value is not reflected in the prices.
One puzzle raised by the preceding analysis is that there have been spectrum auctions
involving complements that appeared to function quite satisfactorily.  The US regional
narrowband auction in 1994 was an auction in which several bidders successfully assembled
collections of regional paging licenses in single spectrum bands to create the package needed for
a nation-wide paging service. In Mexico, the 1997 sale of licenses to manage point-to-point
microwave transmissions in various geographic areas exhibited a similar pattem.  What appears
to be special about these auctions is that licenses covering different regions in the same spectrum
band that were complementary for bidders planning nationwide paging or microwave
transmission networks were not substitutes for any other bidders.  The non-existence theorem
given above depended on the idea that licenses that are complements for one bidder are
substitutes for another. 8
8 Here is an example of non-existence even when licenses are mutual complements for all bidders, but in which the
degrees of complementarity vary.  Tabulated below are the values of three bidders (labeled 1, 2 and 3) for three
licenses (A, B and C).
A  B  C  AB  AC  BC  ABC
I  A  B  C  3  A  B  3
2  0  1  1  1  1  3  3
3  1  0  I  I  3.5  I  3.5
If a competitive equilibrium did exist, its assignmnent  would be efficient, assigning licenses A and C to bidder 3 and
B to bidder 1 or 2.  For bidders 1 and 2 to demand their equilibrium assignments, the prices must satisfy pB<l,
pA+pBg3 and pB+pcŽ 3. However, these together imply thatpA+pCŽ4, which is inconsistent with bidder 3
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The problem of bidding for complements has inspired continuing research both to clarify
the scope of the problem and to devise practical auction designs that overcome the exposure
problem.
4.  AUCTIONS  AND  GAME  THEORY
Another part of economic theory that has proved useful for evaluating alternative auction
designs is game theory. Here we consider two such applications.  The first model formalizes the
ideas that motivated the introduction of the activity rule.  The second is a study of how the
auction closing rules affect the likelihood of collusive outcomes.
The Need for Activity Rules
In designing the auction, one of the concerns was to estimate how long the auction would
take to complete. 9 This, in turn, depended on forecasting how aggressively bidders would
behave.  Could one count on the bidders to move the auction along, perhaps to economize on
their own txansactions costs of participating?  Or, would the bidders sometimes have a strategic
incentive to hold back, slowing the pace of the auction substantially?
There were several reasons to be skeptical that the bidders themselves could be relied
upon to enforce a quick pace.  In the mutual substitutes model analyzed earlier, there is no
affirmative gain to a bidder from bidding aggressively early in the auction, since all naive
bidding paths lead to the same competitive equilibrium outcome.  So, bidders with a positive
motive to delay might find little reason not to do so.  In some of the spectrum auctions, the major
bidders included established competitors in the wireless industry that stood to profit from delays
in new entry caused by delays in the auction process.
There can also be a variety of strategic motives for delay in the auction itself.  Here we
shall use a model to investigate one that is so common as to be decisive for planning the auction
design.  The model is based on the notion that the bidders are, or may be, budget constrained.'°
(A large measure of strategic behavior in the actual spectrum auctions seemed to be motivated by
9 Besides ensuring a minimum pace in the auction, the activity rule has a second, equally important function.  With
the activity rule, bidder eligibility falls gradually during the auction until it just matches the quantity of licenses
available.  The bidders are able to observe this process of declining eligibility and to keep track of the "eligibility
ratio"-the  ratio of total bidder eligibility to the quantity of licenses available. They use the ratio assess how close
the auction is to closing and therefore how close the current prices are likely to be to the final prices. In this way, the
eligibility rules increase the information content of the intermediate bid prices and allow more informed bidding
decisions, possibly improving the allocational efficiency of the auction.
" Budget constraints can have profound effects on bidding behavior and equilibrium strategies. Pitchik and Schotter
(1988) initiated research into the effects of budget constraints; see also Che and Gale (1996 and 1997). For some of
the other effects of budget constraints on actual bidder behavior in the spectrum auctions, see Chapter 1 of Milgrom
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this possibility.) If a bidder's competitor  for a particular  license  is budget-constrained  and its
values or budget are private information,  then the bidder may  gain by concealing  its ability or
willingness  to pay a high price until its competitor  has already  committed  most of its budget  to
acquiring  other licenses. The budget-constrained  competitor  may respond  with its own delay,
hoping  to learn something  about  the prices of its highest  valued  licenses  before committing
resources  to other licenses. These  behaviors  delay  the completion  of the auction. What follows
is a sample  bidding game  verifying  that such  behaviors  are possible  equilibrium  phenomena.
Suppose  there are three  bidders-1, 2, and 3-and two licenses-A and B. Each bidder has a
total budget  of 20 and its total payments  cannot  exceed  this limit. A bidder's payoff is its value
for the licenses  it acquires  minus the total amount  it pays. The values of the three bidders for the
two licenses  are listed in the table below.
Licenses
Bidders  A  B
1  15  30
2  10  Not eligible
3  Not eligible  5 w/ probability  .9
15 w/ probability  .1
The rules of the game are as follows.  Initially, the prices are zero and both items are
assigned to the auctioneer.  At any round, a bidder can raise the bid by one unit on any license for
which it is eligible to bid. Ties are broken at random.  After a round with no new bids, the
auction ends. Payoffs are determined as described above.
Our question is: does there exist a (sequential) equilibrium in which bidders 2 and 3 bid
"straightforwardly," that is, in which each raises the bid on a license whenever it is not assigned
the license and its value strictly exceeds the current highest bid?  If bidder 3's value is common
knowledge among the bidders, then one can routinely verify that the answer is affirmative.
Bidder l's  corresponding strategy depends on bidder 3's value for license B.  If that value is 5,
then at the equilibrium bidder 1 bids in the same straightforward manner as the other two
bidders.  If, however, bidder 3's value is 15, then bidder 1  's best reply is different.  At one
equilibrium, 1 bids straightforwardly on license B and limits its bids on license A to ensure that it
will win license B with its limited budget.
If 3's value is private information, however, then the answer changes.  For suppose that
bidders 2 and 3 bid straightforwardly.  Then 1 could learn 3's value by bidding on license B until
it was assured of acquiring that license, then devoting its remaining budget in an attempt to win
license A.  In particular, 1 would always win license B.  It would also win license A at a price of
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however.  For if there were, then when bidder 3 has the high value, it could wait until  "  is 10
or 11 on license A before bidding more than 5 on license B.  Then, 3 would win licens&i  =nd
earn a positive profit.
Theorem 5.  There is no sequential equilibrium of the private information game f,  ulated
above in wvhich  bidders 2 and 3 each bid "straightforwardly, " as described above.
Both bidders 2 and 3 may have an incentive to slow their bidding in this auction, e ach
hoping that bidder 1 will become unable to compete effectively for one license because it i  tas
spent its budget on another license.  What the equilibrium in this example does not show i 3  a
delay induced by bidder 1, as it avoids committing resources until after bidder 3 has shown its
hand.  I conjecture that the example can be extended to incorporate that feature, so that all
bidders have a tendency to delay.
In the actual spectrum auctions, the activity rule limited such wait-and-see strategies by
specifying that a bidder who remained inactive in the early rounds of the auction would be
ineligible to bid in later rounds.  However, the first auctions cast doubt on the necessity of the
rule.  In the national and regional narrowband auctions, there was far more bidding activity than
required by the activity rule, leading some to propose that the auction be simplified by dropping
the rule.  Hlowever,  the AB block PCS auction, which was the third simultaneous ascending
auction, followed quite a different pattern.  In that auction, the majority of bids were made to be
just  sufficient for the bidder to maintain its current eligibility into the next round, apparently
confirming the importance of the activity rule.
The scatter plot in Figure 1 is based on that auction, aggregating all bidders and all
rounds.  The horizontal axis records the minimum activity required to maintain a bidder's
eligibility while the vertical axis records the corresponding actual activity.  Recall that a bidde r i
"active" on a license if it holds the standing high bid on the license at the beginning of the rouncQ.
or if it makes an eligible new bid for the license.  The volume of activity associated with each
license is imeasured  by the population in the region covered by the licenses according to the 1  `)90
US census,  ("POPs").
There are 3333 data points."'  If the activity rule is forcing bidders to be active, we should
expect actaal bidding activity to lie mostly along the 45°-line. Points below the line represent a
normnal  part of the progress of the auction, as some bidders find that certain prices have become
too high and give up on winning the corresponding licenses.  Points significantly above the line
are contrary to the prediction of the budget constraint model, although some rounding error is
expected due to lumpy licenses.
" Observations  in which  bidders  take a "waiver"  are excluded,  for two  reasons. First, the required  activity  does  not
apply at rounds  with  waivers,  so there is no natural  x-variable. Second,  each bidder  that ceases  bidding  before the
end of the auction automatically  exercises  five waivers  according  to the FCC  rules, so those observations  contain  no
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It is clearly visible in the scatter plot that the modal behavior in this auction involved
bidding quite close to the 45°-line. The average license in this auction covered a region with
approximately five million of population.  Only 30 of the 3333 observations reveal activity that
exceeds the required level by at least one average size license, that is, 5 million POPs, and only
140 observations reveal activity exceeding required activity by more than 1 million POPs.
Free Riding
One of the main issues in the early debates about the spectrum auction was whether all
bidding should be for individual licenses or whether, instead, bids for combinations of licenses
should be allowed.  According to one combinatorial bidding proposal, bids would first be
accepted for certain predetermined packages of licenses, such as a nationwide collection of
licenses, and then bidding on individual licenses would ensue.  After all bidding had ceased, the
collection of bids that maximize total revenues would be the winning bids, and licenses would be
assigned accordingly." 2 Our model of this auction below assumes that in the event of ties,
package bids are selected in preference to bids on individual licenses and that bids must be
entered as whole numbers.
The primary economic argument against allowing combination bids is that such bids can
give rise to a free rider problem among bidders on the individual licenses, leading to avoidable
inefficiencies.  The table below provides a simplified version of an example I presented during
the deliberations to show how that can happen. In this example, there are three bidders-labeled
1, 2 and 3-and two licenses-A and B. Bidders 1 and 2 are willing to pay up to 4 for licenses A
and B, respectively, and neither is eligible to acquire the other license.' 3 With s small and
positive, bidder 3 has the lowest values for the licenses but is distinguished by its desired to
acquire both. To keep the strategy spaces small and ease the analysis, we impose economically
insignificant budget constraints on the bidders, as shown in the table below.
A  B  AB  Budget
1  4  - - 3
2  -4  -3
3  1+6  1+6  2+E  2
1a Depending on what combinations are allowed, there may also need to be rules specifying the winner when there
are overlapping combinations.  Generally, the recommendation was that winning set of bids should be the set that
maxiniizes the total bid price.
'3 In the actual auctions, bidders were ineligible to acquire additional wireless telephone licenses for areas they
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WAIith  the specified values, the sole efficient license assignment has bidders 1 and 2
acquiring licenses A and B, respectively.  With bids restricted to be whole numbers, that
corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the simultaneous ascending auction.  At the
equilibriiun, bidders 1 and 2 make minimum bids at each round as necessary to acquire their
respective licenses of interest, while bidder 3 bids 1 for each license and then gives up.
If the proposed combinatorial auction is used, bidder 3 can refrain from bidding for
licenses A and B directly, bidding instead for the pair AB. This strategy creates a free rider
problem ifor  bidders  1 and 2.  A high bid by bidder 1 on license A helps bidder 2 to acquire
license B.  A symmetric observation applies to bidder 2.  Each would prefer that the other raise
the total of the individual bids sufficiently to beat 3's bid.
Even in the complete information case shown here, this free rider problem can lead to
inefficient mixed strategy equilibria.  The corresponding equilibrium strategies are as follows.  In
the combination bidding round, bidder 3 bids 2 for the license combination AB.  Bidder 1 raises
the price of license A by 1 whenever it does not own the standing high bid for that license.
Otherwise, if at any time during the auction the license prices are 1 for A, I for B, and 2 for AB,
then bidder 1 raises its high bid on license A with probability 2/3. Bidder 2's strategy is
symmetrical to bidder 1  's but focused on license B instead of license A.
The key to understanding this equilibrium is to recognize the payoffs in the subgame after
the prices are 1 for A, I for B, and 2 for package AB. The payoff matrix for bidders 1 and 2 in
that subgame is as follows.
Raise  bid  Don't  raise
Raise  bid  2,2  2,3
Don't  raise  3,2  0,0
This subgame has a symmetric equilibrium in which each bidder raises the bid with
probability 2/3.  Backward induction from there supports the equilibrium strategies described
above.  At the equilibrium, there is a 1/9 probability that 3 acquires both licenses even though its
value for those licenses is just 1/4  Of  the total of the competitors' values. This example is
representative of a robust set of examples, including especially ones with asymmetric
information that make the free rider problem even harder to resolve.
To summarize:
Theorem 6.  The proposed two-stage auction (in which combinatorial bidding is followed
by a simultaneous ascending auction  for  individual licenses) can introduce inefficient
equilibrium outcomes that would be avoided in the simultaneous ascending auction without
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17 bears emphasis that this defect applies to the particular combinatorial rule that was
prC,r  os. c  nmd  is not a general criticism of all combinatorial bidding.
,dlusion  and Closing Rules
Motivated by the idea of the tatonnement, the rules of the spectrum auction specified that
bidding would close on no licenses until there were no new bids on any license.  In that way, if a
license that changed hands at some round were a substitute or complement for another license,
the losing bidder could react by bidding for the substitute or withdrawing a bid for a
complement, and the winner could react in the reverse way.
Strategically, however, simultaneous closings create opportunities for collusion that can
be mitigated by other closing rules.'4 To illustrate this in a simple model, suppose that there are
two bidders, 1 and 2, and two licenses, A and B.  Each bidder has a value for each license of 10.
The auction rules are the same as in the preceding section, with a simultaneous close of bidding
on all licenses when there is no bidding on any license.  The next two theorems, the proofs of
which are straightforward, show that both "competitive" and "collusive" outcomes are consistent
with equilibrium in this game.
Theorem 7.  The  following strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium of the game with
simultaneous closes of bidding. For each bidder, if the  price of either license is below 1O,  bid
again on that license.
This is the "competitive" outcome and results in prices of 10 for both licenses and zero
profits for the bidders.  However, other outcomes are also possible.
Theorem 8. The  following strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium of the game with
simultaneous closes of bidding.  For bidder 1:
If 2 has never bid on license A, then
if license A has received no bids, bid $1 on license A;
otherwise, do not bid.
If 2 has ever bid on license A, then bid according to the strategy described in
Theorem 7.
'
4 An unpublished paper of Rob Gertner, presented at a conference at Princeton University in 1995, inspired our
analysis of closing rules.  His presentation analyzed the vulnerability to collusion of the simultaneous ascending
auction with simultaneous closings and showed that the same form of collusion is not consistent with equilibrium in
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Bidder  2  bids  symmetrically.
This is the most collusive equilibrium, resulting in prices of just 1 for each license and
total profits of 18 for the two bidders, which are lowest prices possible if the licenses are to be
sold.  The collusive outcome is supported by the threat, inherent in the strategies, to shift to
competitive behavior if the other party to the arrangement does not refrain from bidding on a
particular license.
An extreme alternative is to close bidding on a license after any round in which there is
no new bid on that license.  This rule excludes the possibility that bidders can each retaliate if the
other cheats on the arrangement.  For example, suppose that the auction is supposed to end after
round n with a bid price of b<8 on license A, won by bidder 1. Then, bidder 2 has nothing to
lose and, in the trembling hand logic of equilibrium, something to gain by raising the price at
round n+ 1. Consequently, we have the following result.
Theorem  9.  In  the  game  with  license-by-license  closes  of  bidding,  at  every  (trembling
hand)  perfect  equilibrium,  the  price  of  each  license  is  at  least  9.
Similar results can be obtained from a rule that arranges for bidding to close on a license
if there has been no new bid in the past three rounds.  Alternatively, bidding may close on a
license when there has been no new bid for three rounds and the total number of new bids on all
licenses for the past five rounds is less than some trigger value.  Rules along these lines can
allow for substitution among licenses until late in the auction while still deterring some of the
most obvious opportunities for collusion.
5.  DYNAMIC BIDDING  FOR COMBINATIONS  OF LICENSES
The considerations raised in the tatonnement analysis suggest the need to use a
mechanism that does not rely simply on prices for individual licenses and that instead allows
bidding for license packages.  An auction design that, in theory, uses combination bidding to
good effect is the generalized Vickrey auction, also called the Groves-Clarke "pivot
mechanism."'5 Since that will serve as our standard of comparison, we review it briefly here.
Let L denote the set of available licenses and let P be the set of license assignments; these
are indexed partitions of L.  For any assignment SEP, partition element Si represents the set of
licenses assigned to bidder i.
The rules of the generalized Vickrey auction are as follows. Each bidder submits a bid
that specifies a value for every non-empty subset of L. For any set of licenses T, let vi(T) denote
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i's bid for that set.  The auctioneer chooses the license assignment S* that maximizes
v1(S1 *)+.  ..+vN(SN*). Each bidder i pays a pricepi  for its licenses according to the formula:
Pi  = max  vi (Si)  -vj(Si*)
It is well known that, subject to certain assumptions,' 6 the bidders in a generalized
Vickrey auction have a dominant strategy, which is to set their bids for each license package
equal to its actual value.  When each bidder uses its dominant strategy, licenses are assigned
efficiently.  Moreover, if the bidder types have independent, atomless" 7 distributions, then any
other auction design that leads to efficient outcomes must involve the samne  expected payments
by all the types of all the bidders.' 8
The generalized Vickrey auction itself is not practical for use in spectrum sales.  If there
were no restrictions on feasible license combinations, the number of combinations would be
2ELi  1. Most of the sales being conducted presently involve hundreds of licenses, and even
though in practice most of the combinations can be ruled out as infeasible or irrelevant, the
number of potentially important combinations is still infeasibly large.'9 We seek to use the
Vickrey auction here as a benchmark, in much the same way that the competitive equilibrium
benchmark is used in market welfare analyses.
Given that it is infeasible to specify all relevant combinations in advance, one idea to
economize on computing power is to specify combinations as the auction progresses.  The
leading such proposal is based on a procedure called the "Adaptive User S4ection Mechanism"
or "AUSM," that was developed in experimental economics laboratories for solving what the
experimenters regarded as "difficult" resource allocation problems. 20
16 Among the important assumptions are these.  First, the bidders know their own values, that is, this is a pure
private value model with no common value elements. (See Milgrom and Weber (1982) for a discussion of this
assumption.)  Second, bidders must care only about the sets of licenses they acquire and they prices they pay, and
not about the identities of the other license acquirers and the prices they pay.  Third, budget constraints must never
be binding.  Each of these assumptions is a strong one. None precisely fits the facts about the US spectrum
auctions.  In addition, there is the relatively more innocuous assumption that bidder preferences are quasilinear.
This means that a bidder's  utility is representable as the value of the licenses assigned to it minus the price that it
pays.
' I am indebted to Paul Klemperer for pointing out the necessity of the atomless type distribution condition.  In this
application, a "type" is a vector of values for licenses and combinations of licenses.
s For example, see Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988).
19 An additional objection to Vickrey auctions is that it requires bidders to reveal their value estimates.  Bidders have
been reluctant to do that, possibly because they fear that reporting their values would reveal information to
competitors about how they form estimates, what discount rates they use, what financing they have available, or
what their business plans are.
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AUSM differs from the simultaneous ascending auction in a number of respects, and
many of its features have been proposed for adoption in the spectrum auctions.  Among the
proposed changes are the following. First, allow bidding to take place continuously in time,
rather tham  forcing bidders to bid simultaneously in discrete rounds.  Second, in place of an
activity rule, follow the experimenters' technique of using random closing times, which motivate
bidders to be active before the end of the auction.  Third, permit bids for combinations of
licenses, rather than just for individual licenses. When a new combinatorial bid is accepted, it
displaces all previous standing high bids for individual licenses or combinations of licenses that
overlap the licenses in the new bid.  The new bid should be accepted if the amount of the bid is
greater than the sum of the displaced bids.  Fourth, allow the use of a "standby queue" on which
bidders may post bids that cannot, by themselves, displace existing bids but which become
available for use in new combinations. For example, suppose bidder 1 owns the standing high
bid of 20 for license combination ABCD.  Bidder 2 is interested in acquiring AB for a price of up
to 15, but has no interest in CD. It may post a bid of 12 for AB on the standby queue.  Suppose it
does so, and that bidder 3 is willing to pay up to 15 for CD. Then bidder 3 may "lift" 2's bid
from the standby queue and submit that together with its bid of 10 for license combination CD,
thereby creating a bid of 22 for the combination ABCD.  Under the rules, bidders 2 and 3
become the new owners of the standing high bids.
WA'e  begin to analyze this proposal using a simple example, represented in the table below.
There are three bidders, labeled 1-3, and two licenses.  The first two bidders each want to acquire
a single license; the third bidder is interested only in the pair.  The final column shows what price
the bidder would pay in a generalized Vickrey auction in which it is a license winner.
The bidders' values are drawn from continuous distributions.  For the first two bidders,
the distribution has support on [a,b] and for the third bidder, it has support on [c,dl.  We assume
that 2a<d and that 2b>c>b. These inequalities mean that (1) there is a priori uncertainty about
the efficient license assignment and (2) the two single-license bidders need to coordinate to be
able to outbid the bidder 3.
Vickrey Price
A  B  AB
1  Vj  VI  VI  V3V2
2  V2  V 2 V2  V3-VI
3  0  0  V 3 VI+V2
Since there are many different implementations of AUSM, we regard it as a class of
games. W'e limit attention to implementations in which bidding takes place in rounds and does
not end after a round in which there are new bids.  We look for properties of equilibrium in
undominated strategies of any such AUSM game in which no bidder makes jump bids. Three
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would entail using a weakly dominated strategy. With no jump bids, this implies that bidder 3
never pays more than Vj+V2.  Second, since bidder 3 always has an opportunity to respond to
the bids by 1 and 2, equilibrium entails bidder 3 winning a license when V3>  VJ+ V2. Free riding
among the individual bidders may mean that bidder 3's AUSM-equilibrium price is strictly less
than the Vickrey price VI  +  V2. Third, when the single-license bidders 1 and 2 win licenses in an
AUSM game, the total price they pay is V3. They win only when VI+ V2>  V3 and, given the free
rider problem, they may not always win even when that inequality holds. 21 Using the preceding
inequality, the total price V3  that the bidders pay when they win is strictly greater than the total
Vickrey price of2V 3-VJ-V2. This leads to the following conclusion.
Theorem 10.  In the example analyzed here, the total equilibrium prices under AUSMfor
the single-license bidders are always at least as high and sometimes higher than the Vickrey
prices, while the price paid  by the combination bidder is never more and sometimes less than the
Vickrey  price.  The combination bidder wins (weakly) more often than it would at an efficient
auction, and the single-license bidders win (weakly) less often than they would at such an
auction.
Experiments have established that AUSM performs well in some environments with
significant complementarities.  The questions for auction designers are: which kinds? and how
can their disadvantages be minimized?  Identifying biases is a first step toward answering such
questions.
6.  Two ADDITIONAL  QUESTIONS
One of the most frequently expressed doubts about the spectrum auctions is the doubt that
the form of the auction matters at all.  After all, the argument goes, one should expect that if the
initial assignment resulting from the auction is inefficient and if licenses are tradable, the license
owners will be motivated after the auction to buy, sell and swap licenses until an efficient
assignment is achieved.
There are both theoretical and empirical grounds for rejecting this argument.  The
theoretical argument is developed at length in Milgrom (1995). Briefly, the argument combines
two theoretical observations from the theory of resource allocation under incomplete information
in private values environments.  The first observation is that efficient bargaining outcomes in
such an environment are generally impossible to achieve.  The older theoretical literature shows
this for the case where there are just two parties to the bargain and the efficient allocation of the
license is uncertain.  Recent work by Cai (1997) suggests that the efficient outcomes become
even less likely when there are multiple parties involved, as is the case when a bidder needs to
21 Notice that a solution to the free rider problem may require that one bidder pay more for its license than another
bidder pays for a perfectly substitutable license.  One may guess that such a solution would be particularly difficult
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assemble a collection of spectrum licenses from multiple owners to offer the most valuable
mobile telephone service.  The years of delay in developing nationwide mobile telephone
services in the US, despite the value that customers reportedly assign to the ability to "roam"
widely with their phones, testify to the practical importance of this theoretical effect. An
inefficient initial assignment cannot, in general, be quickly corrected by trading in licenses after
the auction is complete.
In contrast, the generalized Vickrey auction in the same environment can achieve an
efficient license assignment-at  least in theory.  There are practical difficulties in implementing
a Vickrey auction in the spectrum sales environment, but the theoretical possibility of an auction
that always yields an efficient outcome suggests that a good auction design may achieve
efficiencies that are not available once the auction is concluded.  That is a large part of the
motivation for finding an auction design that yields a nearly efficient license assignment even
without any post-auction license trading.
A second common question concerns the trade-off between the goals of allocational
efficiency and revenue.  The primary goal of the spectrum auctions was set by the 1993 budget
legislation as one of promoting the "efficient and intensive use" of the radio spectrum.  However,
the simultaneous ascending auction is now also being touted for other applications, such as the
sale of stranded utility assets (Cameron, Cramton, and Wilson, 1997) in which revenue is
regarded as an important objective.  Such applications call for paying more emphasis both on
how the auction rules affect revenue and on the extent of the conflict between the goals of
efficiency and revenue in multi-object auctions.
Particularly when the number of bidders is small, the goals of efficiency and revenue can
come into substantial conflict. A particularly crisp example of this is found in the decision about
how to package groups of objects when there are only two bidders. 22 Using the spectrum sale as
an example, suppose that the available bands of spectrum are denoted {  1,.. .,B} and that these are
packaged in licenses L={l,.  ..,L}.  The ji  license consists of a set of bands Sj  3 { 1,...,B}  and a
"band plan" is a partition S={S,, ...  .,SN} of the L bands into N<L licenses. Let R(S) denote the
revenue from the license sales corresponding to the band plan S and let V(S) be the total value of
the licenses to the winning bidders when the licenses are sold individually in ascending bid (or
second-price) auctions.
NeSxt,  we introduce a special assumption. Suppose that each bidder i's valuation for any
license is given  by X(S 1)  =  IkS  Xk . This assumption  abstracts  from some  potential
interactioins  between efficiency and revenue and isolates the one effect on which we wish to
focus.
22 See Palfrey  (1983) for a related  analysis,  showing  that  bundling  can increase  revenue  even when  it reduces
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The conflict between efficiency and revenue in this context is very sharp.  In choosing
band plans in this setting, there is a dollar-for-dollar trade-offbetween the seller's revenue R(S)
and the value V(S) of the final license assignment: any change in the band plan S that increases
the value of the assignment reduces the seller's revenue by an equal amount!
Theorem 11.  The sum of the value created and the revenue generated by the auction is a
constant, independent of the band plan S: R(S)+V(S)=X1(L)+X2(L).  Coarser band plans
generate higher revenues and create less value.
Proof.  For the first statement, it suffices to show that for any license Sj, the value created
by the auction plus the license price is equal to XI(SJ)+X2(Sj),  for the result then follows by
summing over licenses.
Suppose (without loss of generality) that bidder 1 has the higher value for the license.
Then, in an English auction, bidder 1 will win; the winner's value will be XI  (S); and the price
will be the second highest value, X2(Sj).
For the second statement, recall that the outcome of the ascending auction is to assign
each license to the bidder who values it most highly. Given two band plans S and S' with S
coarser than S', the associated values are
V(S)=  I  maxIxXk,ZX 2 kI  E  E JmaxIXlk,x 2 kI=  V(S)
TeS  keT  keTT  Tes rcT  kEP
rzT
The inequality applies term-by-term to the maxima over sets TE  S.  QED
To illustrate the theorem, suppose there are two bands with xl  >x21 but x12<x22, and
suppose in addition that xl1+xl2>x2l+x22.  There are two possible band plans according to
whether the bands are sold as one license or two.  Selling the bands separately results in bidder 1
winning band 1 at price x21 and bidder 2 winning band 2 at price x12,  creating total value of
x11+x22  and revenue of x21+x12..  Selling the bands together results in bidder 1 acquiring both
at price x21+x22, creating total value ofxll+x 1 2.  The loss of value from adopting this plan is
x22-x12,  which is precisely the same as the increase in revenue from the same change.
In the analysis of Cameron, Cramton and Wilson (1997), the items being sold are
electrical generating plants or other "stranded utility assets" associated with deregulation.  In that
case, revenue (which reduces the burden on ratepayers) and efficiency are both typically among
the goals of the public authority.  In that case, if the number of serious bidders is sufficiently
small, then the effect identified in this suggestion contributes to a trade-off in the public decision
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7.  C;ONCLUSION
In the last few  years, theoretical  analyses  have clearly  proven  their worth in the practical
business of auction  design. Drawing  on both traditional  and new elements  of auction theory,
theorists  have been able to analyze  proposed  designs,  detect  biases,  predict shortcomings,
identify  trade-offs  and recommend  solutions.
It is equally clear  that designing  real auctions  raises  important  practical  questions  for
which curTent  theory currently  offers  no answers. The "bounded  rationality"  constraints  that
limit the effectiveness  of the generalized  Vickrey  auction  are important  ones  and have so far
proved particularly  resistant  to simple  analysis. Because  of such  limits to our knowledge,
auction design  is a kind of engineering  activity. It entails  practical  judgments,  guided  by theory
and all available  evidence,  but it also uses ad hoc  methods  to resolve  issues about  which theory
is silent. As  with other engineering  activities,  the practical  difficulties  of designing  effective,
real auctions  themselves  inspire  new theoretical  analyses,  which  appears  to be leading  to new,
more efficient  and more robust  designs.PUTTiNGA UCTION THEORY TO WORK: THE  SiMULTANEOUSASCENDING AUCTiON  24
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